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CASE COMMENTS
SPEEDY TRIAL-EQUAL PROTECTION OR DUE PROCESS?
The possibility that constitutional rights once waived may never-
theless, in a later proceeding, be reasserted is suggested by United
States ex rel. Pierce v. Lane,' a federal habeas corpus proceeding in-
volving an Indiana state prisoner.
The federal district judge ordered the petitioner discharged from
the state penitentiary upon finding that he had been denied his con-
stitutional guarantee of a speedy trial. The petitioner had been con-
victed of first degree murder in an Indiana state court in 1936 and
sentenced to life imprisonment. Within two hours after sentence, he
had been transported to the state penitentiary and upon his arrival
was immediately placed in solitary confinement. On different occasions
he sought to file, or have filed in his behalf, motions for a new trial;
but these communications were suppressed by prison officials, and
he was not allowed to communicate with his lawyer until after the
statutory time for appeal had passed.2 At that time Indiana provided
no procedural method for belated appellate review. However, in 1948,
the Supreme Court of Indiana ruled that it was within the equitable
powers of courts of general jurisdiction to grant a motion for new
trial after term, 3 and upon the denial of the motion the way was
opened for belated appellate review.4
The petitioner filed his motion for a new trial early in 1949 al-
leging that the following errors were committed in the 1936 trial: the
evidence was insufficient to support the conviction, evidence was im-
properly admitted, the court improperly permitted the jury to sep-
arate, and the court improperly overruled a motion for a continuance.
The 1949 motion for a new trial was granted. Two trials followed.
The first trial ended in a deadlocked jury. The second trial, in 1954,
resulted in a conviction of second degree murder and the imposition
of a life sentence. On appeal the conviction was affirmed,
"193 F. Supp. 395 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
21d. at 396.
'Walker v. State, 226 Ind. 552, 82 N.E.2d 245 (1948).
'"The general rule of appellate practice is that matters which constitute
grounds for a new trial must first be presented by motion for that purpose, and
cannot be assigned as independent errors." Hedrick v. Hall, 155 Ind. 371, 58 N.E. 257
(1900).
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Late in 1959, the petitioner began a federal habeas corpus pro-
ceeding alleging that the 1954 trial resulting from his motion was not
speedy within the meaning of the Federal Constitution.
It is arguable whether the petitioner's contention of lack of speedy
trial would have been meritorious if it had been asserted at the time
of the 1954 trial. The time within which a trial must be had is usually
reckoned from the date of the commencement of the prosecution
against the accused.5 If the original trial ends inconclusively or a new
trial is granted, the time is computed from the date the lower court
received the order or the appellate mandate.6, Also, the provisions of
the sixth amendment are limitations on federal procedure and are not
directly applicable to state trials; 7 however, since the principles laid
down in the Bill of Rights serve as guideposts of due process, a number
of courts have struggled to make the guarantee of speedy trial ap-
plicable to the states via the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.8 Lower federal courts have interpreted decisions of the
Supreme Court as applying this guarantee to state proceedings. 9 The
test whether a guarantee of the Bill of Rights is absorbed by the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment is whether the particular
guarantee is of the "very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty."'1 It
is conceivable that this test would encompass the guarantee of a speedy
trial in a state court, but the Supreme Court has never passed directly
on this point."
Even conceding that the fourteenth amendment does guarantee a
right of speedy trial to a defendant in a state court, and that the de-
fense of lack of speedy trial would have been valid if it had been as-
'See People v. Godlewski, 22 Cal.2d 677, 140 P.2d 381, 384 (1943); see generally
22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 467(4) (1961); 57 Colum. L. Rev. 846 (1957).
6"The procedure since the receipt of the mandate from this [appellate] court
is all that may properly be considered at this time in determining whether or not
petitioner has been denied a speedy trial." Application of Hayes, 301 P.2d 701,
704 (Okla. Crim. 1956).
"'The right to a speedy trial afforded by the Sixth Amendment does not apply to
criminal prosecutions in state courts." United States ex rel. Cseh v. Fay, 195 F. Supp.
432, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
8United States ex rel. Hanson v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 6o8, 61o (7th Cir. 1948). See
note 9 infra.
1"[Ilt is made clear in Smith v. O'Grady, supra, that the procedural guarantee
of the Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution is protected against State
invasion through the Fourteenth Amendment." Boyd v. O'Grady, 121 F.2d 146, 148
(8th Cir. 1911).
"Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). By implication, the Supreme
Court said that only those guarantees that were of the "very essence of a scheme
of ordered liberty" were absorbed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
"See 57 Colunm. L. Rev. 846 (1957).
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serted at the 1954 trial, the failure of the petitioner to assert that de-
fense constitutes a waiver. The cases are in accord that where the ac-
cused does have the right to a speedy trial, it is personal to him and
may be waived. 12 Some courts hold that constitutionally protected
rights are waived by conduct inconsistent with the exercise of the
right; 13 others hold that the waiver must be voluntary, 14 and intelli-
gent,'3 and that no affirmative action is necessary to secure those
rights.' However, if the accused proceeds to trial without asserting
that his constitutional right has been violated, he is deemed to have
waived that right.'
7
The federal district court in the principal case posed the sole ques-
tion of whether the action of the State of Indiana in obstructing a
timely appeal in 1936 and then convicting the petitioner of second de-
gree murder in 1954 constituted a denial of the right to a speedy trial.
At the outset, the court decided that the right to a speedy trial is af-
forded defendants in state proceedings by the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment and concluded that this right had been denied
to the petitioner.
A question raised in the principal case was whether the petitioner,
by voluntarily seeking a new trial, was "estopped" from alleging lack
of speedy trial. The State contended that since the petitioner had
sought the benefits of a new trial he waived his right to attack the
procedure by which it was obtained as unconstitutional. The court,
however, reasoned that the petitioner had not waived his right to as-
sert lack of speedy trial because the belated motion for new trial was
the only procedural method by which he could obtain appellate re-
view. In a situation where a defendant has idly sat by for a number of
"United States ex rel. Hanson v. Ragen, i66 F.2d 6o8, 6io (7 th Cir. 1948);
Ex parte Meadows, 71 Okla. Crim. 353, 112 P.2d 419, 427 ('94'); State v. Pierson,
.113 Mo. 8-1, 123 S.W.2d 149, 152 (1938); Keller v. State, 126 Ohio St. 342, 185
N.E. 417, j18 (933).
13Pierce Oil Corp. v. Phoenix Ref. Co., 259 U.S. 125, 12S-a 9 (1922); United States
ex rel. Hanson v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 6o8, 6io (7th Cir. 1948) (petitioner caused the
dela)); Collins v. United States, 157 F.2d 409, 41o (9th Cir. 1946) (failure to demand
trial); Worthington v. United States, i F.-d 154 (7 th Cir. 1924) (failure to demand
trial).
"Commonwealth v. Kilgallen, 379 Pa. 315, ioS A.2d 780, 785 (1954); Wendlandt
v. Industrial Comm'1n, 256 Wis. 62, 39 NAV..d 854, 856 (1949).
'Webber v. Tunne), 186 MiSc. 270, 59 N.Y.S.2d 455, 456-57 (SUp. Ct. 1945).
"State v. Carrillo, 41 Ariz. 170, 16 P.2d 965, 966 (1932); Shafer v. State, 43
Ohio App. 493. 183 N.W. 771, 775 (1932).
'-United States v. Kaye, 251 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1958); King v. State, 23
Ariz. t9, 201 Pac. 99, 100 (1921); People v. Newell, 192 Cal. 659, 221 Pac. 622, 626
(924). But see People v. White, 2 N.Y.2d 220, 14o N.E.2d 258, 261, 159 N.Y.S.2d 168,
172 (1937) (dicta which implied that the defense may be raised during trial).
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years without availing himself of his appellate remedies and then seeks
and obtains a new trial, the prohibition against allowing him to at-
tack the new trial as not speedy is obvious. The very delay of which he
complains was occasioned by his own inaction.ls But here, the petit-
tioner was prevented from filing a motion for a new trial and no
method for belated filing existed until 1948. Prior to this time there
had never been any opportunity available to the petitioner which he
had refused.
The court appears to be correct in its conclusion that the petition-
er, by filing his motion for new trial, did not waive his right to assert
the defense that the trial was not speedy; but it failed to realize that
the defense was subsequently waived when not asserted at the 1954
trial.19 Its decision, in effect, allows one to raise a defense in a federal
habeas corpus proceeding which had previously been waived.
20
Objectively, it would appear that the action by the State of Indiana
in 1936 in obstructing the petitioner's attempt to file or have filed
motions for a new trial was a denial of equal protection, i.e., a denial
in the sense that everyone convicted of a crime in Indiana was af-
forded an opportunity: (i) to file a motion for new trial, and (2) upon
denial thereof, to receive appellate review.21 While the right to make a
motion for a new trial happens to fall within the ambit of equal pro-
tection in Indiana, it is not, as such, a due process requirement. Due
process secures a minimum protection of rights which are implicit in a
concept of "ordered liberty," 22 while equal protection is broader in
its scope and overlaps the requirements of due process. Equal pro-
tection goes further than insuring a minimum of protection and se-
cures to each person the protection of specific laws that is accorded to
other persons in like circumstances. 23 It has been repeatedly held that
the right to a new trial is not a requirement of due process; 24 however,
isSee note 13 supra.
"See note 17 supra.
'"It has been held that a defendant may not initially claim that he has not
had a speedy trial in a habeas corpus... proceeding." People v. White, 2 N.Y.2d 220,
14o N.E.2d 258, 261, 159 N.Y.S.2d 168, 172 (1957).
mSee Schaaf v. State, 221 Ind. 563, 49 N.E.2d 539, 541 (1943), which held
that, while appeal may not be denied entirely, the appellant must bring himself
within statutory bounds in order to give the appellate court jurisdiction. See Lewis
v. State, 142 Ind. 30, 41 N.E. 31o, 313 (1895), which held that in order for errors
to be assigned for review in the Supreme Court of Indiana, they must first have been
presented in a motion for a new trial.
"See note io supra.
-Kentucky Fin. Corp. v. Paramount Auto Exch. Corp., 262 U.S. 544, 550
(1923); Gardner v. Michigan, 199 U.S. 325, 334 (1905)-
-"'No imperative and mandatory duty or requirement rests upon the state to
provide a mode of obtaining a new trial or review of the proceedings in favor of
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since Indiana statutes afford it to those convicted of crimes, the right
is encompassed by equal protection of the law. The purpose of a new
trial is to allow the trial court to correct its own errors, and so to
avoid the time and expense involved in appellate review.25
Since the Supreme Court of Indiana has the power to modify, re-
verse or affirm trial court decisions, and may, where necessary or prop-
er, grant a new trial,26 it is arguable that the petitioner could have
been seeking a directed verdict of acquittal on appellate review; 27 and
that his sole reason for filing the motion for a new trial was to perfect
his right to an appellate review. However, since the State of Indiana
is free to regulate its appellate procedures, and the motion for a new
trial is not an empty procedural requirement, 2s the subjective desires
of the petitioner cannot control the court's ruling on the motion. Also,
since a number of the errors assigned by the petitioner were statutory
grounds for a new trial,29 it would appear that his objective was to
secure a new trial, not to obtain appellate review for its own sake. The
purposes of a new trial and appellate review are both aimed at cor-
recting errors committed in the original trial,30 therefore the peti-
one convicted of a criminal charge by a proper judicial tribunal. The granting of
such a right is not a necessary element of due process .... I Ward v. State, 171
Ind. 565, 86 N.E. 994, 995 (19o9). "[N]ew trials are not essential to due process of
law, either in judicial or administrative proceedings." 12 Am. Jur. Constitutional
Law § 637 (1938). See Orfield, Criminal Procedure from Arrest to Appeal 498 (1947).
4"Primarily, the office of a motion for a new trial is to afford the court an op-
portunity to correct errors in the proceedings before it without subjecting parties
to the expense and inconvenience of appeal...." Weber v. Kirkendall, 44 Neb. 766,
63 N.V. 35, 36 (1895). See People v. Beal, 315 Ill. 71, 145 N.E. 695, 696 (1924);
Chadron Loan & Bldg. Ass'n v. Scott, 96 N.W. 22o (Neb. 19o3).
3Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-2321 (Repl. Vol. 1956).
7"When a judgment against the defendant is reversed, and it appears that no
offense whatever has been committed, the court rendering such decision on appeal
must direct that the defendant be discharged...." Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-2324 (Repl.
Vol. 1956).
2See note 25 supra.
2"The court shall grant a new trial to the defendant for the following causes,
or any of them:
First. Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, or jury, or for any order
of the court or abuse of discretion by which the defendant was prevented from
having a fair trial.
Second. When the jury has separated without leave of the court-after retiring
to deliberate upon the verdict.
Third. When the jury has received and considered any evidence, paper or docu-
mcnt not authorized by the court.
Ninth. When the verdict of the jury or the finding of the court is contrary
to law, or is not sustained by sufficient evidence." Ind. Ann. Stat. § 9-1903 (Repl. Vol.
1956). See text, supra, for the errors which were assigned by the petitioner.
OOSee note 25 supra.
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